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Caution state law variances!
Remedies (Non-Money) - Avoidance, Attachment, Injunction, Levy, Receiver, Other
UVTA § 7 - Remedies of Creditor.
(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this [Act], a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 8, may obtain:
Reporter's Comment: 4. As under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, a creditor is not required to obtain a judgment against the debtor-transferor or to have a matured claim in order to proceed under subsection (a). See §§ 1(3) and 1(4) ; American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783, 65 A.L.R. 244 (1929); 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences 129 (Rev. ed. 1940).
7. If a transfer or obligation is voidable under § 4 or § 5, the basic remedy provided by this Act is its avoidance under subsection (a)(1). “Avoidance” is a term of art in this Act, for it does not mean that the transfer or obligation is simply rendered void. It has long been established that a transfer avoided by a creditor under this Act or its predecessors is nevertheless valid as between the debtor and the transferee. For example, in the case of a transfer of property worth $100 by Debtor to Transferee, held voidable in a suit by Creditor-1 who is owed $80 by Debtor, “avoidance” of the transfer leaves the $20 surplus with Transferee. Debtor is not entitled to recover the surplus. Nor is Debtor’s Creditor-2 entitled to pursue the surplus by reason of Creditor 1’s action (though Creditor-2 may be entitled to bring its own avoidance action to pursue the surplus). The foregoing principle is embedded in the language of subsection (a)(1), which prescribes “avoidance” only “to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.” Section 9(a) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was similarly limited. See, e.g., Becker v. Becker, 416 A.2d 156, 162 (Vt. 1980); De Martini v. De Martini, 52 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ill. 1943); Markward v. Murrah, 156 S.W.2d 971, 974 (Tex. 1941); Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. 1939); National Radiator Corp. v. Parad, 8 N.E.2d 794, 796-97 (Mass. 1937); 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences § 114, at 225 (Rev. ed. 1940). The transferee’s mental state is irrelevant to the foregoing, but a good-faith transferee may also be afforded protection by § 8.
It follows that “avoidance” of an obligation under subsection (a)(1) likewise should not mean its cancellation, but rather a remedy that recognizes the existence of the obligation and the superiority of the plaintiff creditor’s interest over the obligee’s interest. Ordinarily that should mean subordination of the obligation to the plaintiff creditor’s claim against the debtor. That would entail disgorgement by the obligee of any payments received or receivable on the obligation, to the extent necessary to satisfy the plaintiff creditor’s claim, with the obligee being subrogated to the plaintiff creditor when the latter’s claim is paid. Of course, if the obligation is unenforceable for reasons other than contravention of this Act, contravention of this Act does not render the obligation enforceable.
This Comment relates to the meaning of subsection (a)(1). If this Act is invoked in a bankruptcy proceeding, the remedial entitlements provided by the Bankruptcy Code may differ from those provided by this Act.
JayNote: Section 7 and Section 8(b) provide for the Creditor's remedies.
(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim;
JayNote: The Creditor's main remedy is to simply avoid the transfer, which shifts title back to the Debtor so that the Creditor can enforce his judgment against the asset.
(2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee if available under applicable law; and
Reporter's Comment: 2. The availability of an attachment or other provisional remedy has been restricted by amendments of statutes and rules of procedure in response to Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991), Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and their progeny. This judicial development and the procedural changes that followed in its wake do not preclude resort to attachment by a creditor in seeking avoidance of a transfer or obligation. See, e.g., Britton v. Howard Sav. Bank, 727 F.2d 315, 317-20 (3d Cir. 1984); Computer Sciences Corp. v. Sci-Tek Inc., 367 A.2d 658, 661 (Del. Super. 1976); Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Fontana, 54 A.D.2d 548, 387 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1st Dep’t 1976). Section 7(a)(2) continues the authorization for the use of attachment contained in § 9(b) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, or of a similar provisional remedy, when applicable law provides therefor, subject to the constraints imposed by the due process clauses of the United States and state constitutions.
JayNote: If state law allows, the Creditor may get a pre-judgment attachment against the transferred asset.
(3) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
Reporter's Comment: 3. Subsections (a) and (b) of § 10 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act authorized the court, in an action on a voidable transfer or obligation, to restrain the defendant from disposing of his property, to appoint a receiver to take charge of his property, or to make any order the circumstances may require. Section 10, however, applied only to a creditor whose claim was unmatured. There is no reason to restrict the availability of these remedies to such a creditor, and the courts have not so restricted them. See, e.g., Lipskey v. Voloshen, 155 Md. 139, 143-45, 141 A. 402, 404-05 (1928) (judgment creditor granted injunction against disposition of property by transferee, but appointment of receiver denied for lack of sufficient showing of need for such relief); Matthews v. Schusheim, 36 Misc.2d 918, 922-23, 235 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976-77, 991-92 (Sup.Ct. 1962) (injunction and appointment of receiver granted to holder of claims for fraud, breach of contract, and alimony arrearages; whether creditor’s claim was mature said to be immaterial); Oliphant v. Moore, 155 Tenn. 359, 362-63, 293 S.W. 541, 542 (1927) (tort creditor granted injunction restraining alleged tortfeasor’s disposition of property).
JayNote: The Creditor can obtain an injunction to prevent the Transferee from further transferring the asset.
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
JayNote: The Creditor can also have a Receiver appointed to take charge of the asset (getting a Receiver appointed is often part of a Creditor's end game), since few debtors can stand a receiver very long. The UVTA provides a good way for a creditor to "get the receiver's foot in the door" by taking over a fraudulently-transferred asset, with the idea later being to ask the court to take the slight step of converting the existing limited receivership to a full one.
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
JayNote: This phrase has been held to give courts a "carte blanche" to fashion remedies.
(b) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.
Reporter's Comment: 5. The provision in subsection (b) for a creditor to levy execution on a transferred asset continues the availability of a remedy provided in § 9(b) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. See, e.g., Doland v. Burns Lbr. Co., 156 Minn. 238, 194 N.W. 636 (1923); Montana Ass’n of Credit Management v. Hergert, 181 Mont. 442, 449, 453, 593 P.2d 1059, 1063, 1065 (1979); Corbett v. Hunter, 292 Pa.Super. 123, 128, 436 A.2d 1036, 1038 (1981); see also American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 6, 166 N.E. 783, 784, 65 A.L.R. 244, 247 (1929) (“In such circumstances he [the creditor] might find it necessary to indemnify the sheriff and, when the seizure was erroneous, assumed the risk of error”); McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 404, 441-42 (1933).
JayNote: If the Transferee does not voluntarily turn over the asset, the Court can allow the creditor to enforce the judgment directly against the asset (or its proceeds if it has been sold). However, this section and the Reporter's citation to the American Surety Co. v. Conner opinion seem to indicate that this provision authorizes a creditor to levy (without filing a fraudulent transfer lawsuit) on the transferred asset, and then the voidable transaction issue is then resolved at the hearing on the levy. Nobody seems certain how this works in actual practice.
(g) The following rules determine the burden of proving matters referred to in this section:
(1) A party that seeks to invoke subsection (a), (d), (e), or (f) has the burden of proving the applicability of that subsection.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), the creditor has the burden of proving each applicable element of subsection (b) or (c).
(3) The transferee has the burden of proving the applicability to the transferee of subsection (b)(1)(ii)(A) or (B).
(4) A party that seeks adjustment under subsection (c) has the burden of proving the adjustment.
JayNote: The burden of proving entitlement to a money judgment is on the Creditor.
(h) The standard of proof required to establish matters referred to in this section is preponderance of the evidence.
Prefatory Note (UVTA 2014): Evidentiary Matters. New §§ 4(c), 5(c), 8(g), and 8(h) add uniform rules allocating the burden of proof and defining the standard of proof with respect to claims for relief and defenses under the Act. Language in the former comments to § 2 relating to the presumption of insolvency created by § 2(b) has been moved to the text of that provision, the better to assure its uniform application.
C O M M O N P A G E F O O T E R
RECENT ARTICLES ON FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
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2017.12.18 ... Revocation Of A Company's S-Election By Shareholders Not Deemed A Voidable Transaction In Arrowsmith
2017.12.07 ... 'I Only Gave It To My Spouse In Case I Got Sued' Defense Flops Once Again In Soley Case
2017.08.20 ... One Year Discovery Rule For Fraudulent Transfers Tested In PNC Bank Case
2017.05.30 ... The Good Faith Transferee Defined In Nautilus
Many more articles by Jay Adkisson found here
UVTA - LOGICAL ORGANIZATION (Designed For Litigators)
Overview of UVTA -- The process and result
UVTA - NUMERICAL ORGANIZATION (Confusing & Difficult To Use)
The Uniform Law Commission's complete copy of the UVTA with comments in PDF format is available here. The webpage for the UVTA, showing states that have enacted and much other information regarding the Act is found here.
1 - Definitions
(1) Affiliate -- (2) Asset -- (3) Claim -- (4) Creditor -- (5) Debt -- (6) Debtor -- (7) Electronic -- (8) Insider -- (9) Lien -- (10) Organization -- (11) Person -- (12) Property -- (13) Record -- (14) Relative -- (15) Sign -- (16) Transfer -- (17) Valid Lien
2 - Insolvency
3 - Value
4 - Transfer Or Obligation Voidable As To Present Or Future Creditor
5 - Transfer or Obligation Voidable As To Present Creditor
8 - Defenses, Liability, And Protection Of Transferee Or Obligee
10 - Governing Law
15 - Short Title
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS IN BANKRUPTCY
OTHER INFORMATIONAL WEBSITES BY JAY ADKISSON
© 2018 Jay D. Adkisson. All rights reserved. No claim to government works or the works of the Uniform Law Commission. The information contained in this website is for general educational purposes only, does not constitute any legal advice or opinion, and should not be relied upon in relation to particular cases. Use this information at your own peril; it is no substitute for the legal advice or opinion of an attorney licensed to practice law in the appropriate jurisdiction. This site https://voidabletransactions.com Contact: jay [at] jayadkisson.com or by phone to 949-200-7773 or by fax to 877-698-0678.